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ROBERT T. JONES*

Practical Aspects of Commercial
Agency and Distribution Agreements
in the European Communityt
Introduction
There are at least three principal ways in which an enterprise located
outside the European Community might actively seek to market its products within the Community.
First, it might set up a direct sales network, employing a sales force
based in the Common Market to sell its products.
Secondly, the enterprise might use the offices of intermediaries such as
distributors or commission agents located in the Common Market to sell its
goods. This is often referred to as an indirect sales system.
Thirdly, if the enterprise did not wish to take an active role at all, it
might simply license another party to manufacture and sell the products
within the Market in exchange for a royalty.
None of these methods need necessarily be used to the exclusion of the
others.
Normally an enterprise will have a good idea of which of these systems
it wishes to use before the lawyer is brought in; nonetheless, we lawyers
need to be able to point out some of the practical problems and alternatives.
It must be conceded that an active direct sales approach, with sales
offices of the supplier located in the Common Market, offers maximum
profit potential in that it represents true vertical integration which "cuts out
the middleman" and affords economies of scale.
It also provides the advantage of maximum possible control over personnel and procedures and conditions of distribution.
However, direct sales networks normally require substantial investments
and expenses, and entail many complications as a result of the fact that the
*Resident partner in London Law Office of Frank Boas, London and Brussels, Member
of the California Bar. A.B., Stanford, 1960: LL.B., Harvard, 1963.
tBased on a talk delivered to the Solicitors European Group of The Law Society at The
Law Society's Hall, London, on March 26, 1971.
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supplying enterprise becomes "present" - either directly or through a subsidiary- in the country of distribution and is fully subject to direct taxation
and the regulations on doing business of the host country.
The licensing approach avoids most of these problems and often minimizes the amount of investment required, but in reducing the risks, it also
reduces the profit potential and brings to a minimum the amount of control
which can be exercised.
An indirect sales network-such as an agency or distributorship-is a
middle ground to the direct sales and licensing alternatives. Moreover, it is
an easy way of getting started in the Common Market and can often serve
as a springboard to either of the two systems.
That is, a supplier, after a few years' ekperience with a distributor or
agent, can often find it useful either to take him over, and set up a direct
sales network, or give him a manufacturing license and allow him to take
all responsibility for manufacture and sale in his territory.
Definitions of "Agency" and "Distributor"
The terms "agency" and "distributor" have much more clearly defined
meanings on the Continent than they do in Anglo-American law.
Under the domestic laws of member countries, as well as the EEC
pronouncements, the term "distributor" means a person or entity who or
which is legally and in fact an independent merchant.
Essentially, he buys goods for his own account and resells them, usually
in smaller quantities to several outlets. His profit or loss arises from the
difference between the price for which he buys goods and the price for
which he sells them.
It is crucial to the definition of a distributor that he operates at his own
risk. Indeed, the EEC definition, which is in economic terms, states simply
that the distributor is a person who bears the economic risks of his selling
activities.'
Despite the distributor's independence, the supplying enterprise can, and
often should, provide technical supervision and financial help without
affecting his status.
An agent, on the other hand, while legally an independent entity, is
normally an intermediary who procures business for another enterprise and
for its account, usually receiving a percentage commission by way of
compensation.
Agency law on the Continent considers an agent to be an auxiliary of his
1

Official Notice of the EEC Commission of December 24, 1962, on Contracts for
Exclusive Representation concluded with Commercial Agents.
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principal. He is expected to act for the benefit of his principal as well as for
himself. Therefore, an agent is normally subject to more control by his
principal or supplier than is a distributor.
It is crucial to the definition of an agent that he generally does not bear
2
the economic risks of the sales which he makes.
The only exception is the del credere agent, who guarantees his customer's performance to the principal, and this is usually covered by special
statutory provision under the domestic laws of the member countries.
An agent can represent either a disclosed or undisclosed principal, and
he either can have power to bind his principal or not, without affecting his
status.
The legal independence or separation from the supplier of both agents
and distributors is a key feature of an indirect sales network. All of the
member countries recognize and accept this independence to a greater or
lesser extent.
A major advantage of this independence is that the status of agents and
distributors is, in the main, legally distinct from that of employees of the
nature of sales representatives, or other sales personnel employed by the
supplying enterprise and based in the member country.
Therefore, use of agents or distributors generally avoids, for the supplying enterprise, the application of the whole apparatus of the laws of the
member countries protecting employees from termination of employment
and providing social security benefits and the like.
Moreover, having employees within a member country normally carries
with it the consequence of a permanent establishment in the country. By
using independent agents or distributors instead of employees, a supplier
can avoid the myriad problems which establishment in a member country
entails, including the need to qualify to do business there, pay corporation
tax, etc.
On the tax point, of course, most double tax treaties concluded by the
member countries in recent years, as well as the OECD draft model double
tax treaty, specifically exempt bona fide commission agents or other independent agents from the definition of permanent establishment.
Maintenance of a stock of goods by a supplying company simply for
purpose of delivery or display is also exempted.
Thus, under these treaties, a supplying enterprise dealing through an
indirect sales network with agents or distributors would normally not be
subject to direct taxation by a member country, whereas it would be if it
used direct sales employees based in the Community.
2

1d.
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One caveat should be drawn concerning agents which does not apply to
distributors. Since the status of agents is not dissimilar from typical sales
employees, some of the member countries have begun to assimilate agents
to the status of employees for purposes of indemnification, social security
and the like.
Nonetheless, this treatment is the exception rather than the rule, and the
generalization that agencies, as well as distributors have independence and,
therefore, insulate the supplying company from the problems of doing
business in the Common Market is a fair one.
While still on the definitional track, there is one sport in the categories of
distributors and agents in the EEC. This arises in Italy which has a hybrid
between the principal and agent categories called a commissionario or
3
commission-distributor.
A commissionario is a person who sells goods in his own name, but on
behalf of an undisclosed principal in consideration of a commission. The
peculiarity of this relationship is that he never takes title to the goods, but
invoices them himself and has considerable authority concerning negotiation of payment terms.
In fact the commissionario falls within the definition of an agent, but
since he is treated separately from agents under Italian law, it might be
noted that this special kind of extra-independent agent exists.
A similar classification exists in Belgium and Luxembourg in the case of
commissionaires, who are agents who sell in their own names but for
undisclosed principals. An example is stockbrokers.
One practical lesson that may be drawn from these definitions is that,
while it is possible to mix, say, a distribution and an agency contract, and
have various hybrids such as simultaneous distributor and agent status, and
perhaps a consignment agreement thrown in, it is very important in view of
the clarity of the definitions in European law, to be specific in what one is
doing and not to blur the two concepts of agency and distribution. Very
different legal consequences flow from the two different relationships.
Both English and American lawyers have a tendency to prepare contracts which fall within the European definition of distribution contracts,
but which are typically entitled "sales agency" contracts and in which the
term "agent" is used throughout, even though in fact and law the "agent" is
a distributor. Semantic confusion of this kind can cause severe problems in
Europe, particularly if one gets to litigation.
A second practical point is that, in the case of an agency contract with
an individual, one should be very careful in preserving an agent's in31talian Civil Code (Book IV, Title 3), Article 173 1.
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dependence in order to ensure that he will not be deemed an employee.
The test of whether one is an independent agent or an employee usually
depends on the amount of control, especially in the details and minutiae of
his work, which the principal has and exercises. Special care should be
taken in instances in which an agent represents only one principal, as he
can very easily verge into employee status in this situation.
This problem does not arise with agents who are legal entities, as entities
cannot be employees.
Of the two systems-agency and distributorship-a distributorship is
generally the safer and more conservative, if one is primarily concerned to
insulate the supplying company from the problems of being "present" in a
member country. Provided one adheres in practice to the definition of
"distributor," it seems most unlikely that employee status for sales personnel, or permanent establishment status for the supplying company, could
ever be imputed.
Elements of Typical Distribution
and Agency Contracts
In making the following catalogue of the elements of a typical distribution or agency contract, it is not intended by implication to be advocating either the boiler plate approach, or suggesting that one form of
contract will do for all EEC countries. Indeed, just the opposite: proper
draftsmanship of these contracts always calls for them to be tailored to the
precise situation. Nonetheless, it is not necessary to start de novo every
time, as the essential legal tasks remain the same and most contracts of this
nature have basic elements in common.
First of all, of course, a typical contract will have the identification of the
parties and recitations as to the purpose of the agreement.
In the event that the agreement embodies restraints on competition-such as strong territorial protection or resale price maintenance-it can be helpful to spell out the purposes in detail so that if one
later has an argument to make to sustain the validity of the restraining
clauses, he can show that they were necessary or appropriate to special
circumstances.
The EEC Commission has announced that it will make allowances for
4
restraints when special circumstances can be shown.
Perhaps next in order, a typical contract would have a strict definition of
the products to be sold, enumerating them or describing them in detail.
4

Press Release of the Commission of the European Communities, No. P-46, July 23,
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At this point, one should consider provisions relating to sale of competing products. The agency law of most of the member countries usually
provides that an exclusive agent may not deal in competing goods of other
suppliers. However, this obligation does not apply to distributors or
non-exclusive agents, and should be covered in the contract.
Short of an outright ban on dealing in competing products, one can give
the supplier a right of first refusal with respect to orders for competing
products.
Next, a typical contract would have a designation of the territory and a
specification whether the contract is exclusive or non-exclusive. In most of
the member countries, a contract is presumed to be exclusive unless
explicitly otherwise provided, but it is safest to spell this out.
If it can be negotiated, it is also beneficial for the supplier to reserve a
right to change the territory or to deal with others.
Next, one would include a description of the distributor or agent's
duties, and a specification that no additional compensation is to be paid for
them. It is useful to specify these duties in some detail since, especially in
the distributorship context, few if any obligations are implied from the
relationship.
A provision that no orders from a distributor, and no orders obtained by
an agent, are binding on the supplier until accepted by him should also be
included.
Then one would normally put in a description of the supplier's duty to
supply the goods at a certain price, which is usually the going price as
published in his price list, specifying any discounts that are available, and
reserving the right to change the prices at any time.
It is wise also to include exculpatory clauses for the supplier's failure to
supply or for delaying delivery.
Next, one should provide for direct sales if any. Commonly, if the
contract is exclusive, one will be required to give an overriding commission
to the agent on direct sales, and sometimes on any sales made by other
distributors in his territory.
On occasion a specific list of customers to whom direct sales may be
made can be included, perhaps with special commission rates.
Next might come provisions as to advertising and samples. One should
make clear who has the responsibility to pay for these, and if the distributor pays, to provide for his reimbursement in the event of early
termination of the contract.
If not included under the distributor's duties, one usually should have a
clause governing the maintenance of a reasonable amount of stock to fill
small orders.
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
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Another provision which is optional is a minimum quota. If a reasonable
quota is specified, one can tie to it a right to terminate if the quota is not
met.
A quota provides the supplier with an "out" if business does not go well.
However, artificially high quotas should be avoided, for if an impossible
quota is specified and termination occurs because of it, the courts, at least
in France, might find the termination to be abusive.
Then, of course, a provision as to compensation in the case of an agent
should be included. This should be drafted carefully to cover the base on
which commissions are calculated as well as the rate.
If discounts are envisaged, the commission base should be concomitantly adjusted. The commission clause should also be explicit about
the timing as to when the commission is due- is it the time of the order, the
time of delivery of the goods, the time final payment is received, etc.
Do not set the commission at a high rate thinking that the agent will then
absorb expenses out of his commissions. The reason this is dangerous is
that an agent's gross commissions are used for indemnity purposes, and
although an element of expense reimbursement is included by the parties in
arriving at the commission rate, it may well not be recognized as such and
excluded for indemnity purposes. Therefore, provisions for reimbursement
of the agent's expenses should be made clearly distinct from the commission rights.
In the case of a distributor, a clause should be included to the effect that
his sole profit will arise from his resale of the goods in question.
One should consider also a clause relating to resale price maintenance or
suggested prices. Increasingly, resale price maintenance is becoming subject to statutory regulation, and one must be careful with it under the EEC
anti-trust law, so reference to the latest legal developments both on the
community and municipal levels should always be made before clauses of
this nature are included.
Another important provision is the term of agreement. In case of the
supplier, probably the shorter the term the better, but distributors or agents
generally want longer terms.
An agreement for an indefinite term is a very dangerous animal because
it can give rise to very high termination benefits when it is concluded.
The approach, which is based on the principle of the least of several
evils, is to have the contract endure for a fixed term of, say, two or three
years, renewable thereafter for an additional fixed term of two or three
years and finally determined after the first renewal. Five or six years is
usually a sufficient term and if one has provided a definite conclusion date,
a great deal of grief can be avoided.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
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Renewal should be contingent upon some act such as a written notice of
renewal, rather than by tacit consent of the parties. The practice of having
a contract for one year, renewed tacitly thereafter for one year periods, is
very dangerous because the courts will go out of their way to construe
these as contracts for indefinite periods. The same applies to any contract
renewed several times.
One may also sanguinely provide in the termination clause, that no
indemnity shall be payable on termination either for loss of profit, goodwill, creation of clientele or other like items, as well as no indemnity
payable for advertising costs, costs of samples, termination of employees,
employees' salaries and the like.
The validity of such clauses is doubtful, since the indemnities payable on
termination are very often matters of public policy in the member countries; nonetheless, they afford a basis for negotiation and can have a
"moral" effect.
One clause in connection with termination which might stand up in the
agency context, if not the distributor context, is one to the effect that the
clientele is to be developed and created strictly for the benefit of the
supplier.
This is in logical accord with the general civil-law agency doctrine that
an agent acts for the benefit of his principal; however, even this clause
probably would not hold up in France and certain other countries, where a
doctrine based on the common interest of the agent and his principal has
been developed.
Since it is pretty clear that one generally cannot contract out of the
indemnities which are required by public policy in the countries of the
Community, the next best thing is to take steps to minimize the damage
which termination will effect upon a distributor.
To this end it is useful to include in the contract provisions for buy-back
by the supplier, of the goods and spare parts which the distributor has on
hand at the distributor's cost.
Also, one should provide as long a notice period as the supplier can live
with. If possible, the notice period should be sufficiently long, so that the
distributor, himself, can give reasonable termination notice to any employees whom he might have to discharge, including especially any "key man"
on whom the success of the distribution arrangement depended. This will
cut down the distributor's damages and, therefore, the supplier's damages.
Another item to be considered where termination is concerned is
non-competition and non-solicitation of customers after termination.
Non-competition clauses are not favored by the courts of any of the
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
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countries in Europe, but, nonetheless, limited clauses, properly drawn, can
in some circumstances be upheld.
Normally, such clauses should be limited in time to not more than two
years at the maximum, and should be drafted in such a way as not to
prevent the distributor or agent from gaining a living.
Consideration should also be given to a trademark or trade name license
in respect of the products involved. This is not strictly necessary, because
the laws of the member countries imply such licences from the very
contract of distribution or agency. Nonetheless, to protect the supplier's
property in the mark or name, it is useful to include a license with a strict
reverter so that there is no question that the license which has been granted
is terminated at the same time as the sales relationship, itself, is terminated.
Another standard provision to include is a clause relating to
non-disclosure of trade secrets and customer lists. All documents containing trade secrets furnished by the supplier to the agent or distributor,
should be required to be turned back to the supplier after termination.
It is common also to include in these contracts disclaimers of warranties
beyond those normally made in the company's sales literature, as well as
product or manufacturer's liability disclaimers, the effort being to shift
these liabilities in the distributorship context to the distributor himself.
How valid such clauses are, depends upon the public policy of the forum
state, but as product liability is not yet generally developed in Europe, it is
worth including them.
On the formalities side, distribution or agency contracts should contain
clauses relating to the language to be used, and to the methods by which
notice is to be provided.
A competence or choice-of-law clause is also customary. So much of the
law relating to these contracts should contain clauses relating to the language to be used, and to the methods by which notice is to be provided.
A competence or choice-of-law clause is also customary. So much of the
law relating to these contracts in the member countries is public policy,
that a competence clause may not always be accepted if suit is brought
against the supplier in the host country, but since suits on the contract may
also arise in other countries, competence clauses can be useful.
Arbitration clauses can also be included, and if tied to a competence
clause sometimes can be a way of skirting public policy mandates of the
country of distribution. For example, a contract by an English supplier for
distribution in Belgium and containing a binding reference to arbitration in
England, English law to apply, might be a way of avoiding the Belgian rules
on termination.
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If the matter were taken to a Belgian court, probably the court would not
accept the reference to arbitration. However, in countries with less clearly
enunciated public policies regarding distributor contracts, such as Holland
and Germany, clauses of this type have been upheld.
Features of Domestic Law of the Member States
Regarding Agencies and DistributorshipsP

There is a marked absence of systematic statutory regulation of distribution and ageficy contracts in the member states. As a general rule,
however, agency contracts are much more closely regulated by statute and
agents receive more protection than do distributors.
The interesting legal issues, and the ones upon which we shall focus,
concern the status of agents and distributors so far as special statutory
protection is concerned, what happens on termination, what things can and
cannot be done in the course of the relationship, such as resale price
maintenance and price discrimination, and to what extent can absolute
territorial protection and exclusivity be guaranteed.
Belgium

Starting with Belgium, we have an immediate exception to the foregoing
generalization that agents are given more protection than distributors.
Since 1961 Belgium has had a special statute which accords very substantial indemnity rights upon termination to exclusive distributors with
contracts of indefinite duration.
This statute was expanded and strengthened by amendment in April,
1971 also to cover "quasi-exclusive" distributors who in fact sell nearly the
whole of the products marketed under the agreement in their territory as
well as generally all distributors upon whom "important obligations" have
been placed by their suppliers such as would cause the distributor to suffer
serious harm if the contract were terminated. 6 The term "important obligations" within the meaning of the statute includes obligations to install
5
For this portion of the paper, the author acknowledges his indebtedness to a seminar
held under the auspices of the Institute of Commercial Law of the Catholic University of
Louvain on March 19-22, 1969. Papers were presented at this seminar by lawyers from each
of the countries of the E.E.C. except Luxembourg, and are reprinted in Van Gerven &
Lukoff, editors, Commercial Agency and Distribution Agreements and Related Problems of
Licensing in the Law of the E.E.C. Countries and of the European Communities, Louvain
(1970).
6
Belgian Law of July 27, 1961, as amended by Law of April 13, 1971, STATE GAZETTE
April 21, 1971, pp. 4996-4997. See generally Bricmont & Behaegel, Commentaire de la loi
du 13 avril, 1971 Relative a la Resilation Unilaterale des Concessions de Ventes, JOURNAL

DES TRIBUNAUX,

197 1, pp. 301- 306.
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equipment and organize sales activities according to criteria delineated by
the supplier, obligations to offer after-sale services, minimum sales quota
obligations and requirements to hold minimum amounts of stock and advertise.
An agreement for an indefinite term covered by this statute can only be
determined unilaterally by giving reasonable notice or fair compensation.
This is a matter of firm public policy and the amount of compensation can
only be agreed at the time of termination.
Compensation generally includes the amount which could have been
earned in the notice period, plus elements of award for increases in the
clientele effected by the distributor, expenses laid out by the distributor,
and cost to the distributor of termination including indemnities payable to
employees whom he must dismiss.
The 1971 amendment imposes a very specific method for expiry of
contracts for definite terms. When a distributorship has been granted for a
limited period, the parties are deemed to have agreed upon a renewal of the
agreement at the conclusion of the period, either for an indefinite period or
for a limited period in accordance with a tacit renewal clause if there is one
in the contract, unless termination has been notified by registered letter at
least three months and not more than six months prior to the expiration
date. Thus, in Belgium one cannot rely on a distribution contract expiring
naturally by its terms. In order to avoid falling into the trap of unwittingly
renewing a contract for a fixed term, the statutory procedure for termination should always be drafted into distribution contracts as a contractual
reminder to the parties of what must be done.
In most other respects, the Belgian legislation only applies to contracts
which are deemed to be for indefinite periods. However, the tendency in
Belgium increasingly is to construe contracts as being for indefinite periods
whenever possible.
To this end, the 1971 amendment provides that contracts for fixed terms
which have been renewed more than twice are irrebbutably presumed to
have been transmuted to contracts for indefinite periods. Renewals, incidentally, are deemed to occur even if the terms of the contract are
significantly changed or a new contract is made, the only criteria for a
renewal being that the same parties remain in contractual relation with one
another.
In the interest of minimizing exposure to the Belgian statute, one would
be well advised always to draw Belgian contracts for fixed terms subject to
renewal in writing. As length of the term does not seem to affect the
question of whether the contract is one for indefinite duration, one might
provide a short initial term to allow for a period of testing of the distributor,
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
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subject to a right of renewal for at most two longer terms. In this way, one
should be able to escape the pitfall of having the contract transmuted into
one of indefinite duration by more than two renewals.
Agency terminations in Belgium are not subject to this special law. An
agent is only entitled to indemnity on termination if the termination is done
in a way injurious to the agent. General damage rules apply, which are
7
much less stringent than in the case of exclusive distributorships.
One thing to be avoided whenever possible in Belgium is having employees, including sales representatives, who are employees-as termination
indemnities for senior employees in Belgium of up to two and three years
are possible. 8 Awards of this nature in Belgium are the highest in Europe.
Outside the termination problem, Belgian law is very sparse in regulating
these relationships, and many of the issues which arise in other countries,
such as France and Germany, including resale price maintenance, refusal
to sell and the like do not apply and are not problems in Belgium. Proposals for a stringent law regulating agencies have been discussed in the
Benelux Interparliamentary Council and bills to this end, based on a model
Benelux draft statute, are currently pending in the Belgian legislature, but
no concrete action has been forthcoming.

France
Turning to France, it may be noted that indirect distribution systems
have certain inherent advantages in that they avoid the problems of getting
prior governmental approval, as would usually be necessary for a direct
sales office or a licensing system.
French law has a very strong bias in favor of protecting sales personnel.
The best place to start on this is the law relating to sales employees who
fall into the category of "voyageurs, representants et placiers." 9
These are generally sales representatives who solicit and obtain orders
from customers by calling on them and who have a definite territory or
class of customers assigned to them. These people, whom we may call
VRPs, are really employees, so they are entitled to all of the protections of
the French Labour Code, and they enjoy special statutory protection as
well.
7

Cf. Belgian Civil Code, Articles 1984-2010; Belgian Commercial Code, Book 1, Title
VII, Subtitles I and 2.
8
Belgian Law of July 30, 1963, as amended by Law of November 21, 1969.
9
French Law of July 18, 1937, as amended by Law of March 7, 1957 (Labor Code, Book
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A similar special statute relating to commercial representatives exists in
Belgium. 10
The French statute entitles them to certain notice on termination, plus
an indemnity for termination occurring for any reason except their own
default. They even have a right of indemnity on expiration of a fixed term
of employment where the employer has failed to renew.
The indemnity encompasses a commission on all the orders placed on
business growing out of their work that occur after they leave, plus an
award equal to the value of the clientele that they have created or developed.
These indemnities apply even if the VRP becomes incapacitated or is
unable to work.
The only exception that arises is in the case of the VRP who is on
salary. Recent court decisions have stated that since salaried sales personnel really have no benefit from the clientele they develop, they do not get
the indemnity for build-up of clientele.
VRP status can cause delicate problems in the case of the VRP who is
about to retire. If he is asked to retire, he gets the indemnity, but if he
simply retires voluntarily he does not. These situations obviously have to
be handled with French finesse.
An agency in France is not greatly dissimilar from a VRP, and the
indemnities accorded to agents are similar to those awarded to VRPs.
Agency status in France is specifically regulated by law, 1 on the basis
of the following four criteria: ,First, an agent must be designated as such in
a written contract. Secondly, he must be registered in a special registry of
agents and submit the written contract to the registry. Third, he must not
be on the supplier's payroll, and, fourth, which is the only point leaving
room for argument, he must in fact act independently.
These criteria were originally developed in case law by the courts as a
part of the doctrine of mandat d'interet commun, the essential notion of
which is that the principal and agent have common rights to the clientele
created. It assumes that on termination the clientele stays with the supplier
and that, therefore, an indemnity should be paid to the agent equivalent to
the value of his interest in the clientele.
The statutory counterpart of this doctrine is public policy, and cannot be
altered by contract.
'°See supra, note 8.
"Decree No. 58- 1345 of December 23, 1958, relating to Commercial Agents, as supplemented by Decree No. 68-765 of August 22, 1968, relating to the registration of commercial
agents in a special registry.
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Distributors in France, on the other hand, do not seem to be entitled to
indemnities unless termination of their agreement is abusive. The courts
stretch a point where abuse orfaute grave is concerned, and find it where
we would not find it in Anglo-American law.
Recent court decisions have declined to extend the doctrine of mandat
d'interet commun to distributors, which has the consequence that a distributor in France will always try to argue that he is an agent in fact. This
again necessitates the importance of defining his status carefully in the
contract, and maintaining the formal relationship in practice.
Resale price maintenance or price control by the supplier of his dis12
tributor's selling prices is absolutely prohibited in France.
This presents no problem in the agency situation because an agent
merely solicits orders for his principal, and the principal normally has the
right to accept or reject them at the price fixed by him. There is no
concerted action between two parties in the agency case.
Resale price maintenance is not possible, however, in the case of a
distributor because a distributor and his supplier are deemed independent contracting parties of equal standing.
Therefore any attempt at control of the distributor's selling price by the
supplier, whether by means of prescribed tariffs, minimum prices, fixed or
minimum mark-up percentages and the like, falls within the proscriptions of
the French law on maintenance of free competition.
All that can be done to control resale prices in the distributorship
context is for the supplier to make recommendations-and the distributor
cannot be required to follow them.
Even suggestions of this nature can in theory be prohibited if they are
made in a way backed up by a threat of great economic power, but
apparently no decrees prohibiting recommendations of this kind have been
made.
In addition to the ban on resale price maintenance, French law has a
13
number of restrictions on distribution.
First, it is unlawful to refuse to sell a product to any prospective
purchaser so long as his offer to buy is made reasonably and in good faith.
If a seller has goods in stock he cannot choose between his customers, but
must accept all orders from any customers, whether occasional or regular,
without discrimination.
12See Ordinance No. 45-1483 of June 30, 1945, supplemented and amended by Decrees
No. 53-704 of August 9, 1953; No. 58-545 of June 24, 1958; No. 59-1004 of August 17,
1959; by Act No. 63-628 of July 2, 1963; and by Ordinance No. 67-835 of September 28,
1967, translated and reprinted by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Paris,
in Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices.
13
1d.
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The only exceptions are if the customer's orders are made in bad faith or
for an abnormal quantity or type.
In practice, sellers get around this by stalling delivery and servicing, but
these techniques are not strictly legal.
Secondly, it is unlawful to condition the sale of a product on the purchase of other products, as in tying arrangements, or upon a minimum
amount of products, as in minimum quota clauses.
Thirdly, price discrimination in the form of special discounts not available to all comers is also suspect. These are permissible in the form of
quantity discounts or if they are tied to a reasonable service rendered, but
otherwise they can cause a problem in France.
To safeguard a supplier against price discrimination charges, it would be
wise for him to prepare and circulate an official list of discounts available,
and also keep detailed records of any special services such as advertising
rendered by any particular distributors entitled to discounts.
These statutory restrictions on distribution have been refined in practice
in a way that makes them reasonable in the context of typical distributorship contracts.
For example, the French High Court has held that the refusal-to-sell law
does not prohibit exclusive distributorship arrangements per se, when both
parties voluntarily limit their commercial freedom, the contract has no
price-fixing elements in it, and if indeed the contract tends to improve the
14
services rendered to customers.
Also, the refusal to sell prohibition does not apply to certain high-quality
products, such as luxury watches and perfumes, for the sensible reason
that refusal to sell except to qualified dealers who have experience and
expertise or servicing ability in connection with the product, helps to
maintain the quality of the product.
Moreover, special relief from any of these prohibitions can be obtained
on written application to the ministries concerned, but exemption is intended to be more the exception than the rule.
The French development of these doctrines finds its best expression in
the Fontanat Circular, published by the French Government in 1960.15
Many of the ideas expressed there seem to be finding their way into the
developing EEC law on this subject.
Germany
In Germany, as in most of the other EEC countries, agency is closely
14

Nicholas, Soci6tBrandtFrres,Courde Cassation, July 11, 1962, [1962] D. Jur. 497.
' 5 Circular of March 31, 1960. Translated and reprinted in O.E.C.D. Guide to Legislation
on Restrictive Business Practices.
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regulated by statute,' 6 but no special statute pertaining to distribution
contracts exists.
Great care should be exercised in an agency contract, in specifying the
sales on which an agent is entitled to his commission. If there are some
from which commissions are reserved, this must be made clear. Otherwise,
the law provides that the agent receives commission on all sales made in
his territory.
The law also provides that he is entitled to monthly payment of commissions and that a commission becomes due when an order has been filled.
Obviously the parties may prefer to make other arrangements, but in order
to do so they must spell them out in the contract.
The German Cartel Law does not apply to agency agreements, but it
7
does apply to distributorship arrangements.'
Among the items prohibited are restraints on competition, which inhibit
a party's freedom to use delivered goods or resell them to anyone else,
tying arrangements, and restraints which prevent third parties from obtaining goods.
The authorities view these matters in economic terms, and pay particular
attention to the market power and position of the parties.
Injured parties may take their complaints to the Cartel Office, which
may invalidate agreements deemed unreasonable restraints. However, the
Cartel Office usually gives the parties time to amend or accommodate their
restraints in a reasonable fashion and generally does not impose other
penalties.
Resale price maintenance is unlawful in the distributorship context in
Germany unless certain statutory provisions are met. The statutory
scheme is very strict, and contains the following procedural requirements:
The agreement as to prices must be in writing. It must be attested to and
registered at the Cartel Office. It must relate to branded goods only, and
competing goods must be available on the market. The agreement must
provide for specific rather than for minimum or maximum prices. Most
interesting of all, it must be part of a closed-price maintenance system and
must not, even in theory, leave any loop-holes for special prices or price
discrimination.
Thus, if one is to have resale price maintenance in Germany, all prices
must be the same throughout the country, with no exceptions. Short of
meeting these procedural requirements, all that a supplier can do about
prices is recommend or suggest prices to the distributor.
"G ERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE

(Book 1,Section 7), Articles 84-92c.

17German Law of July 27, 1957, re-enacted January 3, 1966. Translated and reprinted in
O.E.C.D. Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices.
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Non-competition agreements are covered by special statute in Germany,
and the maximum period is two years after termination. There is a statutory requirement that the supplier pay adequate compensation to the agent
during the term of non-competition.
German law provides an exceptional cause of action for compensation
on termination of agencies, except where termination occurs as a result of
the agent's fault.
The compensation award is intended to reflect continuing benefits for the
principal from the agent's activities, loss of probable commission claims by
the agent, and the agent's loss of clientele and goodwill.
The statute sets an upper limit of one annual commission based on the
average of the previous five years, and the courts have elaborated fairly
predictable standards using this upper limit as a guide.
There are no special statutes in Germany relating to the determination of
a distributorship. The primary questions which arise relate to whether the
distributor will be allowed to complete transactions which are underway, to
fill binding orders and to dispose of his stock.
Since termination is not covered by statute, the parties are advised to
cover it in the distributorship agreement.
Italy

In Italy, agency is closely covered by statute1 8 and so is the commission-distributor relationship described previously, 19 but distributorships per
se are not closely covered.
Agents must be registered with the authorities and their relationship is
subject to a number of special regulations.
Italian law provides a unique social security and severance allowance
system for commercial agents, treating them much like employees.
A public body known as Enasarco is entrusted with administration of the
social security and severance-allowance plans for agents.
A supplier is required to contribute an amount equal to 6% of an agent's
annual commissions up to a two-million-lira ceiling to Enasarco for social
security purposes.
For severance allowance purposes, a supplier is also required to contribute certain percentages of the agent's annual commissions, amounting to
something between 3% and 4% total, to Enasarco. These sums are paid by
Enasarco to the agent on termination.
If these amounts have not been paid over by the supplier to Enasarco,
the supplier is liable to the agent for them.
'81TALIAN CIVIL CODE
19

(Book IV, Title 3), Articles 1742- 1753.

See supra, note 3.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. I

124

INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER

Beyond the Enasarco system, an agent in Italy is entitled to four months'
notice of termination. If four months' notice is not given, commissions in
lieu thereof must be paid.
While the method of funding agency termination indemnities in Italy is
unique, the amounts agents are entitled to receive on termination are
generally much lower than in the rest of Europe.
With respect to the commissionario or hybrid commission-distributorship and the true distributorship, reasonable notice for termination
must be given or indemnities paid in lieu thereof. The Enasarco system
for termination does not apply.
Italy has little or no domestic anti-trust legislation or price legislation as
yet, and is not expected to have any, so resale price maintenance and other
typical restrictions on distributors are permissible. The only outer limit
probably would be the rules developed at the Community level.
Holland

In the Netherlands, as in most of the other member countries, special
statutes govern agencies 20 but not distributorships. Much is left to the
agreement in the Netherlands, as there are few regulations either positive
or negative.
It is a peculiarity of Dutch agency law that the agent may be made to
bear only a very limited del credere risk.21 Unless the agent is a company,
he can never be responsible for non-payment by a customer beyond the
amount of his own commission.
Agency agreements for an indefinite term may be concluded on three
months' notice. Dutch law provides only for an equitable remuneration on
termination, but this does not specifically include indemnity for loss of
clientele created.
There are no Dutch decisions spelling out any rules relating to termination of distributorships.
Resale price maintenance is apparently still permitted in Holland.
Absolute territorial protection found its original authority in the 1937
Kolynos case in Holland, 22 but this has later been eroded by judicial
decisions as well as under EEC law.
Community Law
Turning finally to the EEC regulations, the primary provision of interest
is Article 85 of the Rome Treaty.
This article prohibits agreements between enterprises which are liable to
20

NETHERLANDS COMMERCIAL CODE(Book
21
1d., Section 75e.
22

I, Title IV), Sections 75a-75p.

Hoge Raad, November 11, 1937, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1096 (1937).
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prevent, restrict or distort competition within the Common Market, specifically including concerted price fixing, market sharing, price discrimination, tying arrangements and the like.
The possibility of exemption from these prohibitions is provided for
agreements which, while technically in restraint of trade, tend to improve
the flow of goods and services and do not enable the parties substantially to
eliminate competition.
In 1962, the EEC Council made exemption contingent on notifying
agreements to the Commission, 23 but the flood of agreements submitted
was so great that a procedure of granting group exemptions or exemptions
24
for certain categories of agreements is now being followed as well.
Both the courts and the Commission and its staff are obviously having a
great deal of trouble elaborating workable rules which give some predictability, and yet do not unduly impede the overall objective of the
Common Market, which is to improve the distribution of goods and services.
The law which has been developed thus far can be summarized as
follows:
First, Article 85 applies to exclusive distributorships but not to agencies,
as the relationship between principal and agent is not deemed "between
enterprises" within the meaning of the Article.2 5 The Article also applies to
26
licensing agreements between independent enterprises.
Secondly, non-exclusive distributorships which do not put restraints on
sales in any territory or to any person pose no problem whatsoever under
Article 85.27 This seems true even if resale price maintenance is provided.
Thirdly, exclusive distributorships are also generally permissible so long
as they do not have the element of absolute territorial protection. By
"absolute territorial protection" is meant arrangements which prohibit
other distributors from importing or selling products within a given territory and which prohibit the distributor assigned to that territory from
selling or exporting outside his territory.
Exclusive distributorships without absolute territorial protection were
accorded a blanket or group exemption from Article 85 until the end of
1972 by Commission Regulation 67/67.28 The regulation provides that
contracts of this nature do not need to be notified to the Commission.
No. 17 of the EEC Council of February 6, 1962, as amended.
2Regulation
24
Cf. Regulation No. 19 of the EEC Council of March 2, 1965.
supra, note 1.
25See
26
Official Notice of the EEC Commission of December 24, 1962, on Patent Licensing
Agreements.
27
Cf. Mertens & Straet-Bendix (negative clearance June 1, 1964) in E.C. OFFICIAL
GAZETTE, June 10, 1964.
2
SRegulation 67/67 of the EEC Commission of March 22, 1967, E.C. OFFICIAL GAInternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
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There are caveats in Regulation 67/67 which suggest that there could be
a problem if there were a de facto monopoly or competition were wholly
prevented as a result of one of these agreements, but generally these are
safe.
A fourth category relates to exclusive contracts with absolute territorial
protection and containing export prohibitions. These are clearly in violation of Article 85 on the authority of the Grundig-Constencase?9
This was a case arising in France in which Grundig had obliged Consten, its distributor, not to sell outside France, and obliged all its other
distributors in Europe not to sell outside their assigned territories. It had
also included a trademark license for a special trademark, GINT, which
was licensed for the territory of France to Consten.
When another importer brought Grundig products into France and
offered them for sale, both Grundig and Consten sued.
The European Court of Justice held that this suit could not be maintained because the absolute territorial protection conferred was in violation
of Article 85.
The Grundig-Consten decision contains two holdings, either of which
seem to stand alone. Not only was the arrangement of tying up distributors
by re-export prohibitions invalidated, but also the attempt to ensure absolute territorial protection through the special trademark license was held in
contravention of Article 85.
The only exception to the Grundig-Consten rule seems to be a sort of de
minimis situation, where the absolute territorial protection conferred has
no perceptible influence on the market or on competition in the territory.
A specific exemption under Article 85 for an agreement embodying
absolute territorial protection would probably only be possible if the restrictions were necessary to get into a market where a company, probably a
small one, had not done business before.
Conclusion
Looking to generalizations, inasmuch as the EEC regulations, as well as
the competition or anti-trust laws of the member countries do not apply to
agency relationships, perhaps the agency format is preferable to distribution contracts if one senses a restraint of competition problem in the
offing.
ZETTE,

March 25, 1967, p. 849. See also Dru-Blondell, E.C.
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Certainly, by using an agency, a supplier can exercise a great deal more
control over the pricing and method of distribution of his product in the
Common Market than he can with a distributor.
On the other hand, it is surely clear from our review of the domestic law
of the member countries that the special statutory protections offered
agents are much greater than for distributors, especially in the instance of
indemnities on termination - Belgium being the sole exception.
Since the problem of indemnities on termination is always present in
contracts of this nature, and problems under the EEC regulations are
sometime and problematical things, it would seem that the distribution
contract technique is the safer approach in terms of minimizing the overall
financial exposure of the supplying enterprise.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. I

